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Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children
Under the Equal Protection Clause'
I. INTRODUCTION
The assimilato n of the bastard into modern society has not
been accomplished with all delibera;e speed.' This is not to
say that the illegitimate child has been without spokesmen;
even Shakespeare spoke out for him.2 Nevertheless, the bastard
has remained the victim of society's scorn to this day.
The legal posture of the illegitimate child in the United
States has been a topic of extensive research and discussion. The
purpose of this Note is to examine the most recent development
in this area-the extension of equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment to the illegitimate child, the effect of this
extension on his right to inherit wealth from his natural ances-
tors and its implications for estate planners.
II. EXISTING LEGAL BARRIERS TO INHERITANCE
BY THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Intestate inheritance rights have developed very slowly and
sporadically for the illegitimate child. At common law, he was
denied the right to inherit under any circumstances, 3 the appar-
ent rationale being to discourage promiscuity.4 The obvious in-
* This Note has been entered in the 1970 Estate Planning Compe-
tition sponsored by the First National Bank of Chicago.
1. See Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegiti-
mate, 118 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate
Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana, 36 U. CH. L. Rzv. 338 (1969); Krause,
Bringing the Bastard Into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act
on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 829 (1966).
2. "Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as
well compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As honest
madam's issue? Why brand they us *With base? with baseness?
bastardy? base, base?" William Shakespeare, as quoted by Justice
Douglas in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 n.6 (1968).
3. 10 Am. Jun. 2D, Bastards § 146 (3.963). The illegitimate child
was considered to be nullius filius (son of nobody) and therefore
possessed of no rights of inheritance. 2 KET, COMMENTAREs 228
(11th ed. 1867).
4. Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROox=rN L. REv. 45, 47 (1960); 2 KENT,
COMMENTAnIEs 227, 228 (11th ed. 1867). For some time legal writers
have criticized the classification as being unreasonable, arbitrary and
ineffective. The majority of the writers feel that the statutes are com-
pletely out of step with society but few suggest that the entire classifica-
tion should be completely eradicated. See generally Gray & Rudovsky,
supra note 1; Krause, supra note 1; Krause, Equal Protection for the Ille-
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equity of punishing the child for the transgressions of his parents
was apparently considered necessary to accomplish the social
objective.
While the common law rule has been modified in every juris-
diction5 due to the realization that such an arbitrary rule is
both undesirable and ineffective, the illegitimate child continues
to be the target of discrimination. This discrimination takes the
form of both outright prohibitions of inheritance by an illegiti-
mate child, and restrictive judicial interpretations of the words
"child" and "issue." Instances of discrimination may be classi-
fied into three general categories: 1) intestate succession stat-
utes, 2) pretermitted heir statutes and 3) testamentary instru-
ments. The fact that the relevant policy considerations are dif-
ferent for each context has given rise to a lack of uniformity in
the interpretations.
A. INTESTATE SUCCESSION STATUTES
The "estate plans" which are responsible for the disposition
of most estates in the United States are the various intestate suc-
cession statutes. The justification for such statutes is that they
provide for the orderly passing of property which has not been
disposed of by the decedent, and they do so in a manner that rep-
resents the plan the decedent most probably would have chosen
had he expressed his desires on the matter.6
While all states have disregarded the harsh common law
rule to some extent, the bastard is not treated with uniformity.
Some states give the illegitimate child little more than the right
to inherit from his mother,7 while other states8 give him all the
inheritance rights which are enjoyed by legitimates. The great
majority of states fall in between. Usually they grant the child
the right to inherit from his mother unconditionally, and from
his father if the father acknowledges or legitimidzes the child in
the manner prescribed by statute.9 Five states give the ille-
gitimate child the right to inherit from his father on the basis
gitimate, 65 McH. L. REv. 477 (1967); Note, Proposals For Change in
Pennsylvania's Treatment of the Illegitimate, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 566
(1968).
5. Note, Illegitimacy, supra note 4, at 74-79.
6. Krause, supra note 4, at 492.
7. E.g., 20 PA. STAT. AmxN. § 1.7 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-904,
905 (1959).
8. Axz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 109.060 (1968).
9. E.g., MxNx. STAT. §§ 525.172, 525.173 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 152-2-8 (1963).
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of a suit brought by the mother against the father for child sup-
port.10  A similar disparity exists among the states in regard
to the illegitimate child's right to inherit property from his ma-
ternal or paternal ancestors.1  While some statutes' 2 spe-
cifically allow it and others specifically disallow it,13 the ma-
jority of states provide fewer inheritance rights with respect to
the illegitimate child's ancestors than they do with respect to his
parents.' 4
B. PRETEUITTED HErR STATUTES
Pretermitted heir statutes, in general, provide that a child of
a testator who is born after the making of the testamentary in-
strument may take that share of the testator's estate which he
would have taken had the testator died intestate. 5 The un-
derlying presumption is that in such situations the testator is
more likely to have forgotten to revise his will than to have in-
tended to disinherit the child.' 6 The "children" or "issue" to
whose benefit these statutes inure is circumscribed by the com-
mon law rule which has historically defined the words as in-
cluding only legitimate children or illegitimate children who
have been properly acknowledged or legitimized.' 7  This rule,
however, has been relaxed to some extent in many jurisdictions
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-207 (1953); IowA CODE ANN. § 633.222
(1964); K w. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-234
(1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 237.06 (Supp. 1965).
11. Compare Mmn. STAT. § 525.172 (1947), with ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14-206 (1956). Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hodgkin,
48 R.I. 459, 137 A. 381, rehearing denied, 138 A. 184 (1927).
12. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956); ORE. REV. STAT.§ 109.060 (1968).
13. E.g., Mnm. STAT. § 525.172 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-01-05(1960).
14. See generally Note, Illegitimacy, supra note 4. See also Note,
Legislation; Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimates, 84 U. PA.
L. REV. 531, 540 (1936). Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R.I.
459, 137 A. 381, rehearing denied, 138 A. 184 (1927); Turnmire v. Mayes,
121 Tenn. 45, 114 S.W. 478 (1908); Spencer v. Burns, 413 Ill. 240, 108
N.E.2d 413 (1952); Succession of Wesley, 224 La. 182, 69 So. 2d 8 (1953).
15. See Evans, Should Pretermitted Issue be Entitled to Inherit,
31 CALiF. L. REv. 263 (1943); Dainow, Inheritance by Pretermitted Chil-
dren, 32 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1937).
16. T. ATmINsoN, LAw or WILLS 141 (1953). See also MiNI. STAT.
§ 525.201 (1967).
17. The only state which has not accepted this common law rule
is Connecticut. See Dickinson's Appeal, 42 Conn. 491, 19 Am. Rep.
553 (1875). See also text accompanying note 4 supra.
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which consider it merely a presumption and allow it to be easily
rebutted.'18
C. TESTAMwTARY INSTRu mNT
The interpretation of language found in testamentary in-
struments is not bound by the same guidelines as the interpre-
tation of statutory language. Testamentary language derives
its meaning from the intent of the testator which can have no
effect on instruments other than the one under consideration.
Courts have apparently considered this a license to interpret
testamentary language more liberally than statutory language.
While the common law rule which considers illegitimate chil-
dren to be beyond the scope of the words "child" or "issue" also
applies to language found in testamentary instruments, courts
have generally allowed it to be easily overcome by a showing
of contrary intent on the part of the testator.19
III. EXTENSION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
TO THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Recently it has been suggested that the distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children, as it relates to the right of
inheritance, is invalid under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.20  This contention is complicated, how-
ever, by the fact that the mandate of fourteenth amendment
equal protection 21 has been subjected to recent expansion. 22 It
is applied in two distinct areas, each of which has received a
different standard of review.23 The historical standard is ap-
plied when reviewing economic regulation. This standard of re-
18. Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray (Mass.) 535 (1854); King v. Dolan,
255 Mass. 236, 151 N.E. 109 (1926); Barker v. Stucker, 213 Mo. App.
245, 248 S.W. 1003 (1923); Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah 258, 124 P. 1160
(1913).
19. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 326
Mass. 532, 95 N.E.2d 649 (1950); Jung v. Saint Paul Fire Dept. Relief
Ass'n, 223 Minn. 402, 27 N.W.2d 151 (1947). At least two jurisdictions
have rejected this rule. Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269, 91 A. 191 (1914);
In re Ellis, 225 Iowa 1279, 282 N.W. 758 (1938).
20. See generally Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 1; Krause, supra
note 1.
21. "No state shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HnnV. L.
REv. 1065, 1067 (1969).
23. Compare Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949), with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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view is satisfied when the court finds that there is a rational
purpose, for the legislation under review, upon which the leg-
islature could have relied.24 Generally the courts have given
legislatures the benefit of any doubt when there are two possible
purposes for a statute, one which is :permissible and one which
is not.25  Once a rational purpose has been attributed to the
statute, this standard requires that all persons similarly situ-
ated be treated in the same manner.26 Thus, statutes which
are either under-inclusive 27 or over-inclusive 8 are invalid al-
though statutes which violate one of these principles usually
seem to violate the other.29 The burden of establishing a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause is cast upon the challenging
party.30 The Supreme Court has also appeared to grant the
challenged law a presumption of validity.8'
Recently, a more stringent standard of review has been ap-
plied to inherently suspect classifications. The term "suspect
classifications" encompasses an increasing number of possible
classifications, such as race,32 ancestry3 3 and alienage34 as well as
any other classification which is made to affect fundamental in-
terests such as voting,30 procreation3 6 and education. 87 While all
are suspect classifications, courts have treated some more strictly
than others.
Suspect classifications are subjected to a more stringent
standard by rejecting the presumption of validity 8 and casting
the burden of justifying the classification onto the state rather
than the challenging party.3 9 The end result is a much more
careful consideration of the classification and less chance of its
surviving judicial scrutiny.40 The choice between the two stand-
24. Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
25. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
26. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184: (1964).
27. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
28. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
29. Note, supra note 22, at 1086.
30. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
31. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
32. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184: (1964).
33. Koumatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
34. Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
35. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
36. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
37. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
39. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1957).
40. Note, supra note 22, at 1124.
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ards of review exerts a significant influence on the eventual out-
come.
41
Professor Krause has written extensively on the constitu-
tional implications of discrimination between legitimate and il-
legitimate children.42 He concludes that the illegitimate child
is clearly entitled to some benefits which are denied him, al-
though the classification is not necessarily invalid for all pur-
poses. 43 For example, he concedes that the illegitimate child
should not necessarily be entitled to his father's name. Likewise,
he is not willing to maintain that limitations on the right of the
illegitimate child to inherit are a denial of equal protection in all
situations.44 The constitutional rights of the illegitimate are at
best uncertain, yet they are seldom litigated. Only a few recent
judicial actions are worthy of note.
A. THE FRST STEP-Levy u. Louisiana
The United States Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana45
acknowledged that a classification on the basis of legitimacy
could violate the fourteenth amendment. In Levy, five illegiti-
mate children brought an action for the wrongful death of their
mother. The Louisiana court disallowed the claim on the sole
ground that the children were illegitimate. 46 In finding a vio-
lation of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court said:
"[I] t is invidious to discriminate against them when no action,
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm
that was done the mother."47
While no one has attacked the result in Levy, the opinion
of the Court has been criticized for its lack of clarity.48 The
basis for the decision is clearly the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment but the Court failed to designate
41. Id. at 1101.
42. See note 1 supra.
43. His most recent article states: "Whatever the conclusion as to
any specific instance of discrimination, no rational reason supports the
wholesale discrimination imposed by our present legal order." Krause,
supra note 1, at 362.
44. It is not argued that all distinctions between the legitimate and
the illegitimate are not a proper concern of the state in the exercise of
its police power. See generally Krause, supra note 4. But see Gray &
Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 39.
45. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
46. Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (1966).
47. 391 U.S. at 72 (1968).




which standard of review was being applied:"9  Although Jus-
tice Douglas seemed to assail the classification in other situations
as well,50 he carefully concluded that it was applicable only to
the Levy situation. This would appear to imply that there may
be situations in which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
would be a permissible basis for classification. 51
Some language in Levy suggests that other considerations
might be determinative in future cases. An example is the
Court's reference to the intimate familial relationship which ex-
isted between the mother and her illegitimate children.52 If
the Levy Court relied heavily on this factor, the decision will
be of little benefit to illegitimates outside such a relationship.
Such would probably be the case if the parent involved were the
father.5
3
The proper interpretation of Levy is unclear. It has been
suggested that Levy makes any classification based on illegiti-
macy "inherently suspect."54 If this analysis proves to be cor-
rect, the stricter standard of review will be applied to any such
classification. 55 On the other hand, some are reluctant to analo-
gize Levy to other situations in which the classification exists.56
Most are content to hedge and agree with Professor Krause that
in some situations, plausible and desirable reasons exist for dis-
tinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children.
Two courts have held that Levy forbids the state from dis-
criminating between illegitimate and legitimate children in pro-
viding for the child's support. The Supreme Court of Missouri
has stated that the principles applied irn Levy would
render invalid state action which produces discrimination be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate children insofar as the right
of the child to compel support by his father is concerned. Under
49. See text accompanying notes 23-41. supra.
50. Douglas stated that illegitimates, are not "nonpersons" (391
U.S. at 70) and "[1]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to
the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother." Id. at 72.
51. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
52. The Ohio Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest that this
was the basis for the decision in Levy. Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d
166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968).
53. See text accompanying notes 78-81. infra.
54. Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1969).
55. See notes 24-40 supra.
56. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Loui-
siana, 36 U. Cm. L. R.v. 338 (1969); Note, Bastards, 47 TEXAs L. REv.
326 (1968); Recent Decisions, 35 BRooxrmr L. REV. 135 (1968); Current
Decisions, 10 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 247 (1968).
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the guise of discouraging illegitimacy, states may no longer cast
the burden upon the innocent child.57
While this language refers only to actions by children to compel
support, the reasoning may be applied to any situation in which
there is discrimination between legitimates and illegitimates.
In passing on a proposed support agreement, the Family
Court of the City of New York discussed Levy and its effect on
the rights of illegitimate children. The court held that
in the light of the [decision] of the United States Supreme
Court [in Levy] . . , state statutes which discriminate against
children on the basis of a classification as to whether they were
born in or out-of-wedlock must be held to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution. 8
If this all-embracing interpretation of Levy is correct, the effects
of Levy will be extended far beyond its facts.
C. APPLICATION OF Levy TO INHERITANCE RIGHTS
The North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of Jen-
sen 9 is the only court to date to interpret Levy in connection
with the inheritance rights of an illegitimate child. Emilie Jen-
sen was the mother of four illegitimate children and two legiti-
mate children, including Chris Jensen. After Chris Jensen died
intestate, the illegitimate children of Emilie Jensen and their
heirs claimed a right to share in the distribution of his estate.
The applicable North Dakota statute specifically precluded ille-
gitimate children and their heirs from taking a portion of the
estate.60 The lower court upheld the statute but the North Da-
kota Supreme Court reversed, stating: "[W]e have no hesitancy
in holding that [this statute] is unconstitutional as adn invidious
discrimination against illegitimate children in violation of § 1 of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
57. R-v. R-, 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968).
58. Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515, 519 N.E.2d
(1968).
59. 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968).
60. He [any child born out of wedlock] ... however, does not
represent his father or mother by inheriting any part of the
estate of the kindred of his father or mother, either lineal or
collateral, unless before his death his parents shall have inter-
married and his father after such marriage shall have acknowl-
edged him as his child or adopted him into his family. In that
case such child and all the legitimate children in such family
are considered brothers and sisters and on the death of any one
of them intestate and without issue the others, subject to the
rights in the estate of such deceased child of the father and
mother, respectively, as is provided in this code, inherit his
estate as his heirs in the same manner as if all the children had
been born in wedlock.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (1960).
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.... -61 If he Court in Levy was guilty of failing to analyze
more difficult problems, the North Dakota Court is equally, but
more obviously, deserving of the same criticism. It merely
quoted the Levy opinion at great lemgth and then concluded,
"Applying the reasoning in Levy, as no action, conduct, or de-
meanor of the illegitimate children ... is relevant to their status
of illegitimacy, we conclude that the classification for purposes
of inheritance contained in [the statute] . . . is unreasonable. 62
While nothing in Jensen restricts it from being a complete
grant of all rights of inheritance to illegitimate children, the
reasoning of the opinion is demonstrably inadequate in several
respects. The Jensen court cited the New York and California
Codes on the subject of inheritance by illegitimate children with
apparent approval. 63 Yet neither of these provide all the rights
of inheritance for illegitimate children which are provided for
legitimates.64 In addition, the North Dakota Court cited a sec-
ond North Dakota statute approvingly. 65 That statute provides
that should the illegitimate child die intestate without spouse or
issue, his property passes only to his mother unless the father
has specifically acknowledged or adopted the child.66 This sug-
gests that the court had no quarrel with giving the illegitimate
child the right to inherit from his father only if the father ac-
knowledges or adopts him. 7 This statutory scheme, however,
draws severe criticism from Professor Krause for allowing the
father to choose whether or not to give his illegitimate child the
rights which the law gives his legitima;e child.68
IV. THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD'S FUTURE
Regardless of which equal protection standard is applied, the
legislation which discriminates against illegitimate children must
have a purpose which the courts vill consider rational and
proper. The historical basis for the classification was society's
distaste for the parents' activity.69 This reasoning has been thor-
61. 162 N.W.2d at 878.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 255, 257 (West 1956); 17B N.Y. ESTA&TES
POwERs & TRUST LAWS § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
65. 162 N.W.2d at 878.
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-06 (1960).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (1960).
68. Krause, Equal Protection for the Irlegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REV.
477, 492 (1967).
69. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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oughly rejected today,70 but several other justifications for
discriminatory statutes exist. One is that stigmatization of the
illegitimate child tends to protect the family as a unit of society:
The gist of the theory is that the function of reproduction can
be carried out in a socially useful manner only if it is performed
in conformity with institutional patterns, because only by means
of an institutional system can individuals be organized and
taught to co-operate in the performance of this long-range func-
tion, and the function be integrated with other social functions.
The reproductive or familial institutions constitute the social
machinery in terms of which the creation of new members of
society is supposed to take place. The birth of children in ways
that do not fit into this machinery must necessarily receive the
disapproval of society, else the institutional system itself, which
depends upon favorable attitudes in individuals, would not be
approved or sustained.71
It is beyond question that protection of the family unit is a
proper purpose for governmental action.1 2 It is also reasonable
that such discrimination could be considered to protect the fam-
ily unit. An example of this would be to prevent the situation
in which an illegitimate child might inherit the property of his
parent even though the parent's spouse has no knowledge of the
child.7 3 This objection is not persuasive, however, because it
could be resolved by placing the burden of proof on the child
claiming the right to inherit and requiring that parenthood be
established within a certain time of birth. 4
Another justification for discriminatory statutes is found in
70. Id.
71. Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. Soc.
215, 219 (1940).
72. See generally Krause, supra note 68.
73. The committee on the law of succession in relation to illegiti-
mate persons suggested reform in the inheritance laws of Scotland,
Wales and England. However, the report of the committee included
the statement:
[T]he Committee does not recommend that the extra-marital
child should be permitted to succeed to the estate of any relative
on the maternal side other than the mother herself, on the
ground that "it would not be right to impose a system of intes-
tate succession which could, for example, lead to participation
of a daughter's bastard in the intestacy of that daughter's parent
when such participation might be directly opposed to the wishes
of the latter, who, indeed, might know nothing of the bastard.
Reports of Committees, 30 MoD. L. Ruv. 552, 554 (1967).
74. Note, Legislation; Inheritance By, From and Through Illegiti-
mates, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 531, 541 (1936); See MnbN. STAT. § 257.33
(1967) which provides:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of public welfare when
notified of a woman who is delivered of an illegitimate child, or
pregnant with child likely to be illegitimate when born, to take
care that the interests of the child are safeguarded, that appro-
priate steps are taken to establish his paternity .... For the
1345
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the underlying rationale of inheritance laws. As stated earlier,
inheritance laws are intended to pass the decedent's property in
the manner in which he probably would have wanted it to
pass.7 5 Legislatures might easily determine that most people
would not want their property to pass to their illegitimate chil-
dren if they had not acknowledged or adopted the child during
their lifetime. Even more likely is the assumption that kindred
of an individual would not want their property to pass to the
illegitimate child of that individual. While the fourteenth
amendment prevents an individual from relying upon the courts
to support his private discriminatory actions, 76 courts have been
allowed to enforce the distribution of the estate of an individual
regardless of the basis for the distribution. Nevertheless, it has
been suggested that not every estate plan drawn by a state
could make distinctions which the individual would be allowed
to make.77 Consequently, it seems unlikely that this justification
will support discriminatory legislation by itself.
A final justification in support of discrimination is the un-
certainty as to parenthood. Even he strongest advocates of
fourteenth amendment equal protection concede that their argu-
ments are applicable only when paternity has been established.78
That this is one basis of present day discrimination against the
illegitimate child is evident from the nature of the statutes. No
state unconditionally excludes the illegitimate child from in-
heriting from both of his parents.7 9 The majority of states give
the illegitimate child the right to inhe~rit from his mother,80 there
being no doubt as to who the mother is. The illegitimate child
does not fare as well when inheriting from the father.8' The
great variation in these statutes is apparently due to uncertainty
in procedures by which the father is identified. Nevertheless,
the fact that paternity must be proven and the high standard of
proof employed does not vitiate the fourteenth amendment
claims when it is established.
better accomplishment of these purposes the commissioner of
public welfare may initiate such legal or other action as is
deemed necessary ....
75. See note 11 supra.
76. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Burton v.
Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
77. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 54, at 14.
78. Krause, supra note 68, at 490.




1970] - RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
While the denial of inheritance from the parents' families
appears to deserve the same considerations as does the denial of
inheritance from the parents, one additional objection to allow-
ing inheritance from the paternal ancestors does exist. Elimina-
tion of discrimination with respect to these ancestors could re-
sult in the property of the relative of a parent passing to an
illegitimate child of which the relative had no knowledge.8 2 It
is conceded that requiring proof of paternity, at a reasonable
time and in a reasonable manner, would quiet this objection. 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Any attempt to draw a conclusion as to the constitutionality
of any particular law which denies the illegitimate child the
rights of inheritance which are given to his legitimate counter-
part is at best an educated guess. The basic cause of this un-
certainty is the imprecise nature in which the courts have dealt
with the issues to this date. The first question which must be
determined is which standard of review is to be employed.
The cases to date suggest that the more stringent standard
will be applied, keeping the discrimination against illegitimate
children to a minimum. Should this be the eventual outcome,
portions of the applicable statutes of most states will undergo
some change to bring them in line with what has been previ-
ously suggested. Judicial interpretations will likewise need to
be altered to fall in line with the mandate of the equal protection
clause. Interpretation of testamentary instruments would seem
to be the least affected aspect as the theory of state action
voiced in Shelley v. Kraemer 4 appears to be applicable only
when dealing with the most basic of civil rights.
In the event that the more stringent standard is applied,
some discrimination will be allowed on the ground that the state
is allowed to set the standard of proof to be required to show
paternity for any particular purpose."; This is probably a nec-
essary form of discrimination because of the need for certainty
and the difficulty of obtaining it. The degree of discrimination
82. See note 72 supra.
83. See note 73 supra.
84. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
85. The standard of proof which is presently used for determining
fatherhood for the purpose of support need not be the standard used for
determining fatherhood for inheritance purposes. In fact society may
have a much greater interest (evidenced by a lower standard of proof)
in providing for the support of the illegitimate child than in providing
inheritance (evidenced by a higher standard of proof).
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which will be permitted on this basis is not clear but the state
will probably not be allowed to maintain a position of no in-
heritance from the father or the paternal ancestors by means of
an impossible standard of proof. Furthermore, a statutory sys-
tem, under which the state has a duty to maintain a paternity
action on behalf of the child, would likely help support some
degree of discrimination as it would provide a protection for the
rights of the illegitimate child.s6
If the less stringent standard is applied to discrimination
against illegitimate children with respect to their rights of in-
heritance, the permissible degree of discrimination will be
greater. In this event, the numerous justifications for such dis-
crimination will allow the states more discretion in determining
the illegitimate child's rights.8 7
The illegitimate child has indeed made a substantial gain in
his quest for rights which approach those enjoyed by his legiti-
mate brother. Upon final analysis, however, it is clear that the
bastard is not in precisely the same position as a legitimate
child, and probably will not be for the forseeable future. Al-
though the trend toward greater rights for the bastard is likely
to continue, it will probably proceed piecemeal, and, at least in
some legal respects, the bastard may cry, with Shakespeare,
"Why bastard, wherefore base?"
86. See note 73 supra.
87. Even if a legitimate purpose for discrimination is found, it
must still be determined whether an illegitimate child may be the sub-ject of discrimination on the basis of a status over which he has no con-
trol Professor Krause has made the suggestion that discrimination
against illegitimate children should be invalid under the line of cases
exemplified by Robinson v. California, 370 'U.S. 660 (1962), in which it
was held that it is impermissible to hold an individual responsible for a
status or conduct over which he has no control See Krause, supra note
56, at 347. It seems unlikely that the reasoning of Robinson is applicable
in this context since the illegitimate child is not suffering a criminal
punishment as was the defendant in Robinson. In fact, Justice Harlan, in
his concurring opinion in Robinson, specifically limited the holding to
criminal punishment, 370 U.S. at 679.
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